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Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving 
the Relationship Between Law and 
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Robert Postj 
Phil Frickey's death leaves an irreparable hole in the fabric of legal 
scholarship. Frickey never deviated from the perfect balance of integrity and 
tact. He was generous and kind, yet his Midwestern virtues were tough and 
supple as steel. He radiated the instinct of justice, yet his judgment was clear 
eyed and impervious to distraction. His scholarship was unmistakable: 
judicious, perspicuous, wide ranging, and generative. 
I treasured my association with Professor Frickey. I learned from him in 
dimensions scholarly and non-scholarly. I mourn his loss in the best way I can, 
by examining seriously a question that haunted Professor Frickey throughout 
his long and distinguished career: Should judges take account of the political 
consequences of their decisions when these consequences affect the ongoing 
legitimacy of law? In this Article, I explore whether the virtue of technical legal 
craft, which exemplifies the ideal of a formally autonomous law, can 
appropriately be joined to the virtue of judicial statesmanship, which 
exemplifies the ideal of politically responsive law.1 
Copyright ? 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a 
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of 
their publications. 
t Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This article is 
written in memory of Phil Frickey. It was first composed when he was alive, and I was fortunate 
to be able to discuss its contents with Phil and to learn from him. I am grateful to Bruce 
Ackerman, Ed Baker, Richard Falion, Phil Frickey, Paul Gewirtz, Dieter Grimm, Owen Fiss, John 
Manning, Gabe Mendlow, Frank Michelman, Martha Minow, Reva Siegel, Neil Siegel, and the 
members of the Harvard Public Law Workshop, who have all offered generous and helpful 
commentary on early drafts. Patrick Kabat provided throughout outstanding research assistance 
and superb editorial advice. 
1. On the idea of responsive law generally, see Philippe Nonet & Philip Selznick, Law 
and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (Transaction Publishers 2001) (1978). 
On the relationship between responsive law and constitutional adjudication, see Robert Post, 
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 Representations 13 (1990). 
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Frickey applauded "the average American lawyer's instincts" to create an 
open-textured "legal culture."2 He liked the rough and tumble, the 
unpredictability and responsiveness, of conceiving law in this porous way. The 
mechanistic and "transcendental nonsense"3 of legal formalism?which 
pretends to draw a sharp, definitive line between law and the political culture in 
which law is incurably embedded?repelled Professor Frickey. He believed 
that legal practice should resist reduction to any mechanical method because 
the stakes were simply too momentous. 
Yet, if I interpret Frickey correctly, he also dreamt of a law of principles 
that can yield "predictable and nonsubjective conclusions."4 He longed for a 
law that could justify its decisions in the language of reason and impersonality. 
In the collision between these ideals, Frickey ultimately stood for the "view . . . 
that no sharp disjunction can be legislated between law and life, between judge 
and context, between neutrality and value."5 As he once put it, "[l]aw without 
life is no more functional to a thriving society than would be life without law."6 
Frickey evidently believed that judicial statesmanship should be inseparable 
from judicial craftsmanship, because law and politics should be mutually 
interdependent and sustaining. 
I agree with this view, and in this Article I ask how it can be justified. I 
take as my text a recent article that surely numbers among Frickey's 
masterpieces, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, 
Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early 
Warren Court? The article discusses a widely accepted canon of statutory 
interpretation, the avoidance canon, which holds that legislation should be 
interpreted so as to avoid raising and deciding difficult questions of 
constitutional law. The Supreme Court recently appealed to the avoidance 
canon to sidestep the question of whether Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
was constitutional: "'[i]t is a well-established principle governing the prudent 
exercise of this Court's jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a 
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of 
the case.'"8 
2. Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change, 38 Loy. LA. L. Rev. 1971, 1996-97 
(2005). 
3. Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in 
Federal Indian Law, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 649 (2006). 
4. Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 1085, 1090 (1995). 
5. Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture 
in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 199, 220 (1999) [hereinafter Frickey, Revisiting 
the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation]. 
6. Id 
7. Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal 
Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Calif. L. 
Rev. 397 (2005) [hereinafter F ickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy)]. 
8. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009) (quoting 
Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam)). 
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In Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy), Frickey demonstrates that the 
avoidance canon is "a powerful judicial tool," an "aggressive technique" that 
can authorize courts to rewrite statutes even "in the face of clear statutory 
language suggesting a contrary interpretation."9 Frickey establishes that the 
avoidance canon "protects even those values the Court is not prone to enforce 
by traditional judicial review," and that it therefore "has the hybrid quality of 
quasi-constitutional law. It is a tool of public law on the borderline between 
constitutional law and subconstitutional law, and between judicial and 
legislative functions."10 
Frickey concludes that the early Warren Court used the avoidance canon 
to protect significant national values and to deflect strident McCarthyite anti 
communist legislation that was plainly inimical to the spirit of a healthy 
democracy. As Frickey puts it: 
By generally deciding these cases at the subconstitutional level 
through the rules of avoidance, the Court used techniques that might 
defuse political opposition while incrementally adjusting public law to 
better respect individual liberty. Employing avoidance also shifted the 
burden of overcoming legislative inertia to those opposing the Court's 
understanding of public values. The canons allowed a divided and 
besieged set of Justices to avoid the sharpest confrontations with 
Congress and each other so as to preserve the Court's stature and 
integrity. They also gave the Court time for the political furor to 
subside, for First Amendment and due process values to reemerge in 
the general consciousness, and for Congress and, indeed, the Court, to 
change composition and move past a crisis. In short, the rules of 
avoidance, putatively about judicial restraint and deference to political 
institutions, allowed the Court to play a game of high-stakes politics, 
to correct individual injustice in some circumstances, and to protect its 
independence and future autonomy.11 
Frickey discusses decisions of the early Warren Court that deployed the 
avoidance canon and that are now "virtually neglected."12 Frickey's aim was to 
rehabilitate these quiet but effective decisions, which today have fallen into 
obscurity because in retrospect they seem tepid and cautious. They neither give 
full-throated expression to the constitutional values we identify with the later 
Warren Court, nor do they defend the virtues of professional formalism. They 
are instead indirect and subtle, using lawyerly skills to efface their innovation 
and moral commitments. Frickey manifestly loved these decisions and invited 
us to share his appreciation. His point was precisely that these modest, 
unknown cases used the avoidance canon to bestride the boundary between law 
and politics by joining brilliant "legal craftsmanship" to wise "judicial 
9. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy), supra note 7, at 461. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 401. 
12. A/, at453. 
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statesmanship." 
The fusion of craftsmanship and statesmanship renders the avoidance 
canon controversial. The fusion underscores a tension that has pervaded 
American constitutional law since its inception. When Alexis de Tocqueville 
observed that federal judges must be not merely competent legal professionals 
but also "statesmen,"14 he meant that they must understand and use the power 
of public opinion "to confront those obstacles that can be overcome, and to 
steer out of the current when the tide threatens to carry them away, and with 
them the sovereignty of the Union and obedience to its laws."15 In Getting from 
Joe to Gene (McCarthy), Frickey makes an analogous point about the Warren 
Court. He demonstrates that the Warren Court was savvy enough to use 
technical legal reason to protect fundamental constitutional values like freedom 
of speech despite the overbearing "current" of McCarthyite repression. 
Judicial decision making is always enveloped within a larger political 
context that endows judicial work with legitimacy and effectiveness. This 
context matters. It is why, for example, President Lincoln did not think to end 
the secession of Southern states by petitioning for an injunction from the 
Supreme Court.16 To function, law must be perceived by its audience as 
properly authoritative. Because judicial statesmanship requires courts to 
theorize the preconditions of their own effectiveness, it requires them also to 
take account of this larger political context.17 To affirm judicial statesmanship 
is to assert that it can sometimes be appropriate for technical judicial reason to 
consider this ambient political environment. 
This assertion is highly contentious. Many believe that judges should 
restrict themselves to the professional virtues of technical lawyers. "To expect 
judges to take account of political consequences?and to assess the high or low 
degree of them?is to ask judges to do precisely what they should not do."18 
13. Id. at 454 (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech 
in America 222 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988)). For a recent and excellent account of judicial 
statesmanship, see Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 959 
(2008). 
14. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 150-51 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., Doubleday Anchor 1969) (1835). 
15. Id. 
16. Justice Brewer accurately observed: 
[It would have been] puerile and ridiculous to have read a writ of injunction to Lee's 
army during the late civil war. It is doubtless true that inter arma leges silent, and in the 
throes of rebellion or revolution the processes of civil courts are of little avail, for the 
power of the courts rests on the general support of the people and their recognition of 
the fact that peaceful remedies are the true resort for the correction of wrongs. 
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 597 (1895). 
17. See Siegel, supra note 13, at 979 ("Judicial statesmanship means that judges must seek 
not only the 'right answer' to legal questions as a matter of professional reason but also an answer 
that sustains the social legitimacy of law."). 
18. Cheney v. District Court, 541 U.S. 913, 920 (2004) (memorandum of Scalia, J.). Scalia 
believes that only "principle and logic" should determine "the decisions of this Court." Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Robert C. Post, The Supreme 
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Judges, on this account, have no business considering public opinion; they 
should remain mere expert craftsmen, learned and proficient in the law, 
oblivious to political consequences. They ought not to meddle in politics, even 
to save significant legal values like "the sovereignty of the Union" or freedom 
of speech. 
In this Article, I defend Frickey's position that judicial craft may at times 
appropriately be supplemented by judicial statesmanship. I do so by offering a 
sociological account of the relationship between law and politics that suggests 
how judicial statesmanship can further the essential social functions of both law 
and politics. 
I begin in Part I by considering Herbert Wechsler's concept of "neutral 
principles," which even today remains the single most influential justification 
for repudiating judicial statesmanship. Wechsler's contrast between law as a 
realm of reason and politics as a realm of arbitrary fiat continues to resonate 
powerfully in contemporary thinking. Part I argues that this dichotomy is 
empirically false and theoretically misguided. It does not help us to understand 
how law and politics are or should be connected to each other. 
Part II discusses the work of the legal process school, which advocates 
that judges should regard politics as a realm of purposive and reasonable 
behavior. Frickey himself has been powerfully influenced by legal process 
jurisprudence. Part II argues that although legal process jurisprudence grasps 
important and essential forms of social solidarity, it nevertheless fails 
adequately to account for the stubborn and irresolvable disagreements that 
characterize politics. Legal process jurisprudence cannot justify judicial 
statesmanship because legal process jurisprudence does not respect the 
unreasonable controversies that pervade politics. 
Part III offers a new and distinct conception of politics that I hope will 
enable us better to grasp the phenomenon of judicial statesmanship. I argue that 
politics is a complex social form that, on the one hand, presupposes 
fundamental agreement that controversies should be resolved through the 
peaceful medium of politics, but that, on the other hand, presupposes that 
political actors will continue to disagree about their political agenda and 
political goals. Whenever political actors come to believe that they have 
reached agreement about their agenda or their goals, or whenever they wish to 
act as if they had reached such an agreement, they characteristically turn to 
distinct social forms of organization like bureaucracy or law. Bureaucracy and 
law each rest on the presumption of agreement, although not necessarily on the 
fact of agreement. 
Court, 2002 Term?Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 30-33 (2003) [hereinafter Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution] 
(comparing the assumption of legal autonomy implicit in formalist constitutional jurisprudence 
with the actual dependence of constitutional law on ambient constitutional culture). 
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Part IV argues that questions of judicial statesmanship typically arise 
when the basic agreements necessary to sustain a polity, and hence to sustain 
legal institutions, are at risk. De Tocqueville precisely alludes to such 
circumstances, as does Frickey in his discussion of the Warren Court's use of 
the avoidance canon. Questions of judicial statesmanship arise whenever judges 
believe it important to retain the presumption of agreement that underlies legal 
modes of decision making. Judicial statesmanship flows from the recognition 
that modern heterogeneous societies maintain solidarity and control by using 
politics and law as distinct phases of a larger and more inclusive process of 
social integration. 
Part V draws on this descriptive analysis to offer normative reflections 
about the role of judicial statesmanship. It argues that in light of the larger 
social function of law, it would be self-defeating for courts to ignore the need 
to maintain the fundamental forms of agreement that sustain both politics and 
the legal system. 
I 
Herbert Wechsler: Naked Discretion and Neutral Principles 
Even as Frickey praises the avoidance canon cases of the early Warren 
Court for situating themselves "between judicial and legislative functions,"19 he 
expresses nagging doubts about the legitimacy of their judicial stance. Frickey 
fears that formalist critics might indict the early Warren Court decisions for 
interpreting statutes "less neutrally than constitutional text, structure, and 
history require."20 Frickey is worried by the charge that judges "are supposed to 
apply neutral principles regardless of societal context, letting the chips fall 
where they may."21 "Judges are not supposed to be statesmen or 22 
stateswomen." 
Frickey's articulation of the potential tension between judicial craft and 
judicial statesmanship illustrates the enormous contemporary power of Herbert 
Wechsler's influential 1959 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at the Harvard 
Law School, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law?3 In that 
lecture, Wechsler set forth a potent conception of the relationship between law 
and politics. Not only is Wechsler's conception reflected in the critics whom 
Frickey opposes, but its influence is also apparent in Frickey's own work. 
Wechsler's goal in his Holmes lecture was to defend the institution of 
judicial review from the assault of Learned Hand during the preceding year.24 
19. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy), supra note 7, at 461. 
20. Id at 454. 
21. Id 
22. Id. 
23. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 
1 (1959). 
24. Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958). 
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Hand had famously observed, "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled 
by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I 
assuredly do not."25 Wechsler countered by contending that the Constitution 
required judicial review, and that such review was justified because it was 
fundamentally distinct from mere political decision making.26 Whereas political 
decisions register merely preference and desire, the "legal quality" of judicial 
decisions "inheres primarily in that they are?or are obliged to be?entirely 
principled. A principled decision ... is one that rests on reasons with respect to 
all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality 
transcend any immediate result that is involved."27 
Wechsler distinguished law from politics on the ground that law consists 
of reason whereas politics consists of arbitrary will and power.28 He disagreed 
with "[t]hose who perceive in law only the element of fiat, in whose conception 
of the legal cosmos reason has no meaning or no place."29 Because reason 
expresses itself in "principles," the sign that a decision is legal rather than 
political is that it is "principled." Frickey signals the influence of this 
jurisprudential view when he offers to explain how "the avoidance canon can 
be used effectively in a principled manner."30 
If law is distinguished from politics because it is "entirely principled," 
much depends on what it means to be "principled." Wechsler was badly 
confused on this point, and his confusion has influenced legal scholars ever 
since. To act from principle is to act from reason. This is a very weak condition 
to impose on human conduct. It is difficult to imagine human behavior that is 
utterly without reason. Yet Wechsler's effort to distinguish politics from law 
leads him to imagine politics as embodying simple "fiat"31 or "will."32 
Wechsler writes that politics is the realm of "willfulness"33 and the "naked 
25. Id. at 73. "It certainly does not accord with the underlying presuppositions of popular 
government to vest in a chamber, unaccountable to anyone but itself, the power to suppress social 
experiments which it does not approve." Id. 
26. By contrast, Hand had argued that judicial review often depended upon little more than 
the "personal preferences" of judges. Id. at 70. 
27. Wechsler, supra note 23, at 19. Compare Hand, supra note 24, at 70. 
28. The effort to define law in terms of reason is of very ancient origin. Consider: 
Law, in all its divisions, is the strong action of Reason upon wants, necessities, and 
imperfections. No matter whether its ministration is by a legislative or through a 
judicial faculty, or by the consentaneous acts of individuals under no manifest 
compulsion; it is still the act of those on whom it has pleased divine Providence to 
bestow the attribute of reason, as distinguished from those who are guided only by 
instinct, and can make no rules for themselves. 
William Rawle, A Discourse on the Nature and Study of Law 4 (1832). 
29. Wechsler, supra note 23, at 11. Compare Hand, supra note 24, at 70. Law, Wechsler 
asserts, must "be framed and tested as an exercise of reason and not merely as an act of willfulness 
or will." Wechsler, supra note 23, at 11. 
30. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy), supra note 7, at 454. 
31. Wechsler, supra note 23, at 11. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
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power organ." 
Of course, history suggests that persons in politics, like persons 
everywhere, may at times act from purely Hobbesian motives. But it is parodie 
to imagine politics as consisting merely of fiat and will. Even the most cursory 
survey of political history suggests that in politics citizens debate and settle 
great questions of national ideals and values.35 Significant principles were as 
much at stake in the political debates over the Civil Rights Act of 196436 as 
they were in the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions explicating and 
applying that statute.37 Reason and principle matter in politics, just as they 
matter in law. 
We ought not condescend to Wechsler's reductionist characterization of 
politics, however, for it remains the foundation of much contemporary political 
science. Political scientists typically conceptualize politics as an arena for the 
aggregation of "bare" preferences.38 They imagine preferences as exogenous 
desires bereft of reason.39 Preferences drive conduct without justification or 
explanation and are hence frequently characterized as "sovereign."40 
Although it is questionable whether this concept of "preferences" is 
coherent,41 it is certainly intelligible. We understand it in the way that we 
understand that "individual welfare is all that matters in policy choices";42 or in 
the way that we understand Pareto optimality43 or social choice;44 or in the way 
34. Id. at 19. 
35. See Frank Michelman, Bringing the Law to Life: A Plea for Disenchantment, 74 
Cornell L. Rev. 256, 257-63 (1989); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the 
Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 1 
(2003). 
36. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
37. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964: The Passage of the Law That Ended 
Racial Segregation 30 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997); Charles Whalen & Barbara Whalen, 
The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 232-33 (1985). 
38. "Some of the most well-established conceptions of public law view the state as a 
mechanism for aggregating private preferences." Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with 
Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129, 1129 (1986). "Legislatures ... are not 
ideologically committed or institutionally suited to search for the meaning of constitutional values, 
but instead see their primary function in terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of 
the people." Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term?Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1979). For an example of the metaphor of "bare" preferences, see Richard 
. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value 
Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121, 2207 (1990). The idea that 
preferences are stripped of reason is sometimes expressed in terms of "unexamined and unjustified 
preferences." J. Kevin Quinn, Nancy K. Kubasek & M. Neil Browne, Resisting the Individualistic 
Flavor of Opposition to Model Rule 3.3, 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 901, 912 (1995). 
39. Mark Sagoff, Values and Preferences, 96 Ethics 301, 303(1986). 
40. Sunstein, supra note 38, at 1129-30. 
41. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903 (1996). 
42. Edith Stoke y & Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis 262 (1978). 
43. David Williams, Legitimation and Statutory Interpretation: Conquest, Consent, and 
Community in Federal Indian Law, 80 Va. L. Rev. 403, 451 (1994); see also Howard F. Chang, A 
Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 173 
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that we have come to conceive politics as the scene of an interest-group 
pluralism consisting of "uninhibited bargaining among the various participants, 
so that numbers and intensities of preferences can be reflected in political 
outcomes."45 In all these conceptions of politics and public policy, citizens do 
not act from reasons, principles, or values, but simply out of naked will; they 
are driven by exogenous bare preferences. 
This picture of politics is even detectable in Getting from Joe to Gene 
(McCarthy). When Frickey ponders whether the avoidance canon can be 
justified on descriptive grounds, or whether it would induce "strategic" 
behavior "based on the political environment at the time the Court is 
deciding,"46 he observes: 
[0]ne may suspect that, while Congress can certainly draft a bill 
explicit enough to force the Court to reach a constitutional question, 
support for or opposition to the bill will be based on policy preferences 
that are either unadorned by constitutional justification or that embrace 
such justifications as boilerplate simply because they are consistent 
with the politics driving the support or opposition.47 
In passages like this, Frickey conceives politics in an essentially Wechslerian 
manner. Politics is a regime of bare preferences that drive behavior in ways that 
are uncontrolled by reason or principle. 
If we accept the dichotomy between politics as will and law as reason, it 
would be scandalous to permit politics to infect law. If the act of judging were 
no more than the legal imposition of preferences, there can be no justification 
for using life-tenured judges to clog political processes.48 This account of the 
dichotomy between law and politics licenses the work of those political 
scientists who imagine all collective life as simply the push and pull of desire. 
(2000); cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 
1015 (2001) ("[A]lthough adherence to the Pareto principle may not directly determine policy 
choices in most real situations, it nevertheless has powerful implications for what criteria for 
making policy choices one can plausibly employ."). 
44. Pildes & Anderson, supra note 38; see also Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided 
Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 Yale L.J. 1219, 1225-28 (1994) (reviewing applications of 
social choice theory to problems of policymaking in legal scholarship). 
45. Cass. R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 32 
(1985). In this conception of politics, "[t]he common good amounts to an aggregation of 
individual preferences." Id. at 32-33. 
46. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy), supra note 7, at 449. 
47. Id. Frickey concludes, "[i]n the final analysis, even leaving aside cynical suspicions 
about manipulative Justices and politically driven members of Congress who freely ignore their 
oaths of office to uphold the Constitution, no judicial role as intrusive into Congress's law 
creation function as that licensed by the avoidance canon can be easily justified based on 
descriptive notions." Id. at 450. 
48. For an argument to this effect, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 (1971). Martin Shapiro has attempted to offer justifications 
for judicial review even on the assumption that politics consists merely of preferences. Martin 
Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral Principles, 
31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 587 (1963). 
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These political scientists, who enjoy tasking legal scholars with na?vet? for 
affirming that law can reflect principles,49 see law as a disguised venue for the 
ongoing struggle among preferences.50 They deny the distinction between law 
and politics because they deny the role of reason in human conduct. Once we 
imagine a stark contrast between reason and will, in other words, we have set in 
motion a dynamic in which law can become inconceivable from the perspective 
of politics, and in which politics is contamination from the perspective of law. 
On this account, Frickey's ambition to combine "legal craftsmanship" with 
wise "judicial statesmanship" is a simple aporia. 
The dichotomy between reason and will, however, is far too crude to 
capture the difference between law and politics. Reason exists in politics, just 
as will exists in law.51 If law and politics are to be convincingly distinguished, 
therefore, Wechsler must instead specify the kind of reasoning that defines 
law.52 Throughout his lecture, Wechsler associates legal reason with non 
consequentialism. Wechsler sketches a portrait of political men "who, vouching 
no philosophy to warrant, frankly or covertly make the test of virtue in 
interpretation whether its result in the immediate decision seems to hinder or 
advance the interests or the values they support."53 He warns that "[t]he man 
who simply lets his judgment turn on the immediate result may not... realize 
that his position implies that the courts are free to function as a naked power 
organ."54 In passages like these, Wechsler explicitly equates decisions guided 
49. E.g., Henry R. Guck, Courts, Politics, and Justice ix (1st ed. 1983) ("There is a 
great deal of evidence that formal law cannot adequately account for judicial behavior and that 
social science research provides more complete and realistic explanations."); Jeffrey Allan 
Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 32-64 
(1993) (reviewing and rejecting variants of the "legal model" of judicial decision making in terms 
ranging from merely unhelpful to "fatuous" and "meaningless"); Barbara M. Yarnold, 
Politics and the Courts: Toward a General Theory of Public Law (1992) (criticizing the 
"law school" model of judicial decision making). 
50. See Shapiro, supra note 48, at 589 (noting political scientists' "vision of the Court as 
one political actor among many"). This vision is most closely identified with the attitudinal school 
of political science, "[a] predominant, if not the predominant, view of U.S. Supreme Court 
decision making," which "supposes that the ideological values of jurists provide the best 
predictors of their votes." Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. Politics 812, 812 (1995); see, e.g., Segal & Spaeth, supra 
note 49, at 64-73. 
51. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
52. Sometimes Wechsler seems to associate law with general reasons, as distinguished 
from particular reasons. But it is a common legal query to ask how general a rule should be. The 
appropriate generality of a rule is a judgment that can be ascertained only by careful and 
contextual inquiry. In some circumstances an abstract rule better achieves the purposes of the law; 
in other circumstances a concrete standard. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 
Term?Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22 (1992). The same 
is true for political actors who sometimes act on general principle and sometimes on 
contextualized judgments. Either approach can be applied appropriately in law or in politics. 
Degrees of generality do not plausibly distinguish law from politics. 
53. Wechsler, supra note 23, at 11. 
54. Id. at 12. 
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by immediate results with politics as distinct from law. 
Although Wechsler attacks legal actors who act for consequentialist 
reasons,55 he is incorrect to assume that legal reasons are not consequentialist in 
form.56 Many legal rules direct us to cause some consequences, even immediate 
consequences, and to avoid others. For example, Section 1-103 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code provides that the Code must be liberally construed "to 
promote its underlying purposes and policies, which are: (1) to simplify, 
clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (2) to 
permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, 
and agreement of the parties; and (3) to make uniform the law among the 
various jurisdictions."57 Another overtly consequentialist rule is the tort 
doctrine that "public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it 
will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective 
products that reach the market."58 In the context of constitutional law, a 
plurality of the Court recently observed that "quite a few" constitutional rights 
"are clearly instrumental by any measure."59 So, for example, a central theme 
of First Amendment jurisprudence is that judges should establish doctrine that 
creates "breathing space" for the exercise of First Amendment freedoms;60 a 
central justification of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule is to serve as 
an "effective deterrent to lawless police action."61 
There are countless such consequentialist doctrines in the law, in which 
the function of legal rules is "to hinder or advance" particular "values."62 How 
could such doctrines be objectionable in an age that understands law to be, in 
Roscoe Pound's famous formulation, "a means, not an end" for the 
"satisfaction" of social needs?63 Deontological reason is controversial enough 
in ethics and morals, but it is a puzzle why judges should imagine it desirable to 
decide cases in ways that are deliberately oblivious to consequences, immediate 
or otherwise.64 
55. Id. at 11. 
56. Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy 63-67 (2003). 
57. U.C.C. ? l-103(a) (2005). 
58. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring). Consider in this context the contract doctrine of efficient breach. See, e.g., Walgreen 
Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273, 274 (7th Cir. 1992). 
59. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3048 (2010) (opinion of Alito, J.). 
60. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963). 
61. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965). 
62. Wechsler, supra note 23, at 11 ; see supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
63. Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 Green Bag 607, 612 
(1907). 
64. Ronald Dworkin's famous distinction "between arguments of principle on the one hand 
and arguments of policy on the other," is not to the contrary. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously 82 (Harvard University Press, 1978) (1977). Dworkin writes, "Arguments of principle 
are arguments intended to establish an individual right," whereas "arguments of policy are 
arguments intended to establish a collective goal." Id. at 90. Dworkin defines a "goal" as "a 
nonindividuated political aim, that is, a state of affairs whose specification does not. . . call for 
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Wechsler sought to bolster his anti-consequentialist account of law by 
using the adjective "neutral" to describe the kinds of reasons that define law. 
The adjective "neutral," as the Oxford English Dictionary informs us, always 
presumes a baseline; one is neutral with respect to "controversy, dispute, war, 
etc."65 On one interpretation, therefore, Wechsler's use of the adjective 
"neutral" means merely that legal decision makers must be neutral as between 
the parties before them. They must apply to a case the "neutral" reasons of the 
law rather than adopt the "partisan" reasons advanced by either side to a 
lawsuit. This seems true and unobjectionable, but it is also trivial. It is simply 
another way of saying that judges ought to apply legal reasoning no matter 
what parties appear before them. The question Wechsler needs to illuminate, 
however, is how to define legal reasoning itself. 
Wechsler therefore deploys the adjective "neutral" in a second and distinct 
way. He asserts that legal principles can count as law only if they are 
themselves "neutral." He refers in the title and throughout his article to "neutral 
principles of constitutional law."66 But if it is clear what it means to apply a 
legal principle neutrally, it is not at all clear what it means for a legal principle 
itself to be "neutral." Wechsler never explains what a neutral principle is;67 he 
never specifies the contestants or controversies with respect to which principles 
of constitutional law must be neutral. If constitutional law must be neutral with 
respect to all contestants and all controversies, then constitutional law must be 
"neutered," which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as "castrated or 
spayed."68 
Wechsler's appeal to "neutral principles," therefore, implicitly but 
powerfully resonates with his rejection of consequentialist principles. 
Consequentialist principles are designed to advance particular values, and for 
this reason they cannot qualify as "neutral" with respect to those values. 
any particular opportunity or resource or liberty for particular individuals," and he defines a 
[political] right as "an individuated political aim." Id. at 91. Although Dworkin argues that courts 
should rely primarily on arguments of principle, the ultimately operative contrast that he 
establishes is between individuated and non-individuated aims, not between consequentialist and 
non-consequentialist rules. Thus Dworkin concedes that rights can be established by rule 
utilitarian arguments that make "the force of a right contingent upon its power, as a right, to 
promote some collective goal." Id. at 95. "What is important," Dworkin concludes, "is the 
commitment to a scheme of government that makes an appeal to the right decisive in particular 
cases." Id. at 96. For a clear statement of this difference, see John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 
64 Phil. Rev. 3 (1955). 
65. Oxford English Dictionary Online: neutral, http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/ 
00323 716?single= 1 &query_type=word&queryword=neutral&first= 1 &max_to_show= 10 (last 
visited Apr. 5,2010). 
66. Wechsler, supra note 23. 
67. The best and deepest discussion of this point remains Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, 
Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 
Stan. L. Rev. 169 (1968). 
68. Oxford English Dictionary Online: neutered, http://dictionaiy.oed.com/cgi/entry/ 
00323714?single= 1 &query_type=word&queryword=neutered&first= 1 &max_to_show= 10 (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2010). 
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Wechsler's advocacy of neutral principles is thus best interpreted as another 
expression of his belief that legal reasoning must be non-consequentialist. 
Wechsler advances an analytic framework designed to rebuke judges who 
aspire to exercise what Max Weber once acutely called an "ethic of 
responsibility" for consequences.69 
Wechsler's fusion of neutrality and non-consequentialism has proved 
deeply influential. Frickey, for example, once felt it necessary to affirm, contra 
Wechsler, "that no sharp disjunction can be legislated... between neutrality 
and value."70 Such an affirmation could only be necessary to quiet a vague but 
nagging sense that judges ought not craft rules to nourish particular values. Few 
stop to ask what it might mean for a judge to be indifferent in principle to the 
consequences of the law that she makes. Frickey cogently speculates that a 
person who could do such a thing would find "self-satisfaction in the role of 
automaton rather than human being," and that we should be "scared to death to 
give that person the power of the judge, the authority to exercise the coercive 
power of the state."71 It would seem absurd for a legal system to adopt rules 
that were not meant to nourish and sustain particular values. 
Why, then, does the Wechslerian image of neutral principles cling so 
tenaciously to our skirts? One possibility is that it expresses our need to believe 
that judges apply law but do not make it. It might be said that judges are not 
responsible for the consequences of their decisions because they "are the mere 
instruments of the law, and can will nothing."72 Judges simply enforce the rules 
they are given and are immune from responsibility both for the rules and for 
their application. 
This line of thought, however, is unacceptable. Judges must be 
responsible for the consequences of applying rules so long as the rules they 
apply are consequentialist in nature. And we are long past the day when we can 
plausibly imagine judicial work as merely ministerial and mechanical, like the 
work of a scribe or a computer. Because everyone knows that judges have 
discretion in their interpretation of the law, judges cannot be excused from the 
consequences of fashioning legal rules in one way or another.73 If the point of 
legal rules is to nourish human ends, and if judges can shape the content of 
69. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 77, 
120 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. and trans., 1991). 
70. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 5, at 
220. 
71. Philip P. Frickey, Wisdom on Weber, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1169, 1196 (2000). Frickey 
continues, "[m]y own sense is that most judges are pretty much like the rest of us: when we are 
faced with an important decision, we work from the current context backwards, attempting a 
thoughtful mediation of whatever important, crosscutting values are at stake." Id. 
72. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824). 
73. From the internal point of view of the law, of course, judges merely follow the law. For 
an example of the knots that judges get themselves into when they seek to reconcile this internal 
perspective with the fact of judicial discretion see, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 270 
(2008). 
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legal rules in differing ways, it is difficult to see how judges can be free to 
adopt what Weber calls "an 'ethic of ultimate ends,"' an "absolute ethic" that 
"just does not ask for 'consequences.'"74 
Wechsler's effort rigorously to separate law from politics is thus 
unconvincing.. It does not follow, however, that judges ought to be statesmen. 
To establish his position, Frickey needs a positive account of law that will 
authorize the union of judicial craftsmanship with judicial statesmanship. For 
this account, Frickey turns to an understanding of law developed by Wechsler's 
contemporaries at Harvard, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. 
II 
The Legal Process School: Purposes, Politics, and Law 
Frickey was one of the great contemporary scholars of the legal process 
school.75 The founders of that school, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, did not 
conceive law as "neutral" or non-consequentialist. They instead believed that 
law was purposive. They understood law as serving values that emerged from a 
political arena that was itself purposive. As Frickey puts it: 
Their approach understood all law?including the legislature's role in 
statutory creation and the administrative and judicial roles of statutory 
implementation and application?as a purposive endeavor designed to 
promote social utility. They assumed the legislature to be made up of 
reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably, and the 
judges interpreting statutes to be engaged in the reasoned elaboration 
of those purposes as they could be made to fit within the broader legal 
fabric.76 
To understand this conception of law and politics, we need to unpack what it 
means to act in a "purposive" manner. We need to distinguish purposive 
conduct from instrumentalist rationality. 
Wechsler imagines politics as an "instrumental" regime in which persons 
act to satisfy their preferences. This view is well developed in the literature of 
contemporary political science: members of a polity seek "to maximize 
individually held goals,"77 and therefore act as "egoistic, rational, utility 
maximizer[s]."78 Whenever human behavior is conceived as guided by 
instrumental reason, one must assume that human ends are given and that 
persons seek to satisfy these pre-existing ends.79 This view is well expressed in 
74. Weber, supra note 69, at 120. 
75. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems 
in the Making and Application of Law (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) [hereinafter The Legal Process]. 
76. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy), supra note 7, at 405. 
77. Morris P. Fiorina, Formal Models in Political Science, 19 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 133, 150 
(1975). 
78. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice: A Survey, 14 J. Econ. Literature 395, 395 (1976). 
79. "A central tenet of classical theories of rational choice is that people harbor a stable, 
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the metaphor of "exogenous" preferences, which expresses the fixity and 
"givenness" of human objectives. 
Although this concept of instrumental reason is not absent from the 
jurisprudence of Hart and Sacks, their account of purposive behavior differs 
from mere instrumental rationality. The "purposivism"80 of the legal process 
school envisions human objectives as neither fixed nor given, but instead as 
chosen or constructed.81 Hart and Sacks believe that reasonable individuals can 
achieve the right balance between competing ends, not because individuals can 
maximize their second-order preferences, but because they can make deliberate 
decisions about which goals to pursue in which circumstances. Purposivism 
thus poses a threshold question: how can people choose ends that do not merely 
reflect their own pre-existing, subjective preferences? How can they escape 
from the prison of instrumental reason? 
The legal process school responds to this question by postulating that 
persons are "reasonable," meaning that they possess the capacity for judgment. 
Judgment is not about maximizing the attainment of particular ends, but instead 
about the interpretation and application of intersubjective norms or standards. 
"Judgment implies a community that supplies common grounds or criteria by 
which one attempts to decide."82 Judgment is impossible unless there are 
"underlying grounds of judgment which human beings, qua members of a 
judging community, share, and which serve to unite in communication even 
those who disagree (and who may disagree radically)."83 Because "we require a 
definition of community in order to know how the judgment shall proceed,"84 
the reasonable person always inhabits a particular community85 and always 
well-defined, and discernable order of preferences, and have computational skills that enable them 
to choose the courses of action that maximize their preferences." Dan Simon, Daniel C. Krawczyk 
& Keith J. Holyoak, Construction of Preferences by Constraint Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
331, 331 (2004). The authors argue: 
Research has challenged the axiom of preference invariance. Rather than being stable, 
well-defined, and discernable, preferences have been shown to be constructed; to some 
degree they are labile, reversible, and obscure. Preference invariance is violated under 
different descriptions of essentially the same options, when different modes of 
elicitation are invoked, and when options are presented in different contexts. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
80. Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1898 (2008). 
81. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
70, 76 (2006) ("[O]ne can ... plausibly cast purposivism as an objective framework that aspires to 
reconstruct the policy that a hypothetical 'reasonable legislator' would have adopted in the context 
of the legislation, and not the search for a specific policy that Congress actually intended to 
adopt."); see also id. at 90-91 ("[T]he theory of Legal Process purposivism, much like that of 
modem textualism, treats the attribution of meaning as a construct."). 
82. RONALD BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT 143 (1983). 
83. Id at 142 (emphasis omitted). 
84. Id. at 143. 
85. See Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 
CALIF. L. REv. 491 (1994); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: 
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 601 (1990); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the 
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seeks to give the best possible account of the values of that community. 
The reasonable person is thus not trapped within a set of subjective 
preferences; she instead participates within a continuously rewoven 
intersubjective web of values.87 Because intersubjective values are socially 
constructed rather than merely given, the reasonable person does not conceive 
these values as fixed. The meaning of these values continuously emerges 
through shared processes of interpretation and application. 
This distinction between intersubjective values and exogenous personal 
preferences fundamentally differentiates reasonableness from instrumental 
reason. Intersubjective values acquire their meaning through social processes of 
explanation and justification. Preferences, by contrast, need not and often 
cannot be explained or justified; they simply exist. Instrumental reason 
maximizes the fulfillment of given and determinate ends; reasonableness 
emerges from dialogic processes by which ends are determined. 
As a jurisprudence, therefore, purposivism has important implications for 
understanding the process of interpretation. Frickey makes these explicit when 
he explains: 
Interpretation is a method by which a community?an interpretive 
community?goes about part of its business. ... It is only by capturing 
the broader assumptions about the enterprise that we can make sense 
out of the lesser included function to be performed by interpretation 
for that enterprise.88 
Interpretation on this account is neither a matter of simple craft, nor a matter of 
mechanical instrumental reason. It is instead a process of meaning 
construction, through which social values are ascertained and applied. A 
purposivist jurisprudence cannot exist in a society that lacks common social 
values. That is why Frickey objects so strongly to the "unhealthy trend in our 
society" of "increasingly privatizing the public sphere."89 To live a purely 
private life, to be answerable only to private preferences, is to unravel the 
social connections that constitute both persons and law. 
The purposivism advanced by Frickey and the legal process school 
imagines law as an institution that serves the public values of the community. 
Law should be "neutrally" applied as between the parties to a dispute, but law 
does not itself consist of "neutral" principles that are non-consequentialist. Law 
is instead purposive, incorporating and sustaining relevant social values. 
Common Law Tort, 11 Calif. L. Rev. 957 (1989) [hereinafter Post, The Social Foundations of 
Privacy]. 
86. See Sagoff, supra note 39. 
87. Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 473 (1997). 
88. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, supra note 4, at 1092-93. 
89. Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct 
Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 Willamette L. Rev. 421,442 (1998). 
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The idea that law promotes social values is attractive and easy to 
understand.90 The question we are pursuing, however, is whether this concept 
tion of law will help us understand whether judicial craftsmanship should be 
joined to judicial statesmanship, such that judges can properly take account of 
the political consequences of their decisions. We cannot parse this question un 
less we have some account of what it means for consequences to be "political." 
The legal process school has great difficulty offering such an account. The 
premise of the legal process school is that judges should regard legislators as 
reasonable persons who use law to attain reasonable ends.91 But this poses a 
deep puzzle: how can our political life be so continuously driven by sharp and 
intense controversies if, as the legal process school imagines, political actors 
are to be regarded by the law as sharing the common purposes that constitute 
reasonable persons? The persistence of hot and intractable political disputes 
suggests that, in fact, politics is not inhabited by "reasonable persons" who 
participate in a shared, intersubjective web of meanings and values. The legal 
process school historically foundered on this problem; it shattered on the sharp 
rocks of 1960s-style contestation. The violent clashes of the period appeared to 
warrant those who believed that politics was a mere war of autistic preferences. 
The legal process school declined after the 1960s because it did not 
contain a very clear picture of politics. It is highly uncertain what it might mean 
for judges to regard political actors as reasonable when politicians do not 
appear to act in a reasonable manner. In Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy), 
for example, Frickey portrays the Warren Court as resisting a Congress whose 
purposes were flatly inconsistent with democratic values. Was Congress acting 
reasonably when it enacted the repressive statutes that the Warren Court sought 
to ameliorate? If not, would the legal process school have nevertheless 
instructed the Justices of the Warren Court to act as if Congress were acting 
reasonably? 
90. For such an account of law, see Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the 
Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul 
Mishkin, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1473 (2007) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics 
Distinction]. 
91. The Legal Process, supra note 75, at 1378. The crucial passage provides: 
In determining the more immediate purpose which ought to be attributed to a statute 
... a court should try to put itself in imagination in the position of the legislature which 
enacted the measure. 
The court, however, should not do this in the mood of a cynical political observer, 
taking account of all the short-run currents of political expedience that swirl around any 
legislative session. 
It should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was 
made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably. 
It should presume conclusively that these persons, whether or not entertaining 
concepts of reasonableness shared by the court, were trying responsibly and in good 
faith to discharge their constitutional powers and duties. 
The court should then proceed [to ask] . . . Why would reasonable men, confronted 
with the law as it was, have enacted this new law to replace it? 
Id. 
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This suggests that at the heart of the legal process school lies a mute but 
stubborn refusal to recognize the distinctively unreasonable aspects of 
politics.92 To act reasonably is to act from mutually acknowledged principles 
and values. But if in fact politics is a domain in which principles and values are 
perennially subject to contestation and disagreement, a presumption of 
reasonableness must operate to deny the ongoing reality of political dispute. 
This denial has important implications for the subject of this Article. So 
long as legal process jurisprudence authorizes judges to ignore the actual 
purposes of Congress and instead to presume that Congress acts from 
reasonable purposes,93 the necessity for judicial statesmanship need never arise. 
Courts are driven to work at the "borderline ... between judicial and legislative 
functions"94 only when the exercise of their judicial craft would lead to 
manifestly undesirable results. Legal process jurisprudence deftly sidesteps this 
possibility. 
For this reason, the jurisprudence of the legal process school cannot 
sustain Frickey's support for judicial statesmanship. We cannot properly 
formulate the question of judicial statesmanship, nor can we comprehend the 
need for such statesmanship, until we first forge an account of politics that is as 
much about fundamental disagreement as it is about shared purposes. Politics is 
not populated merely by reasonable persons. But, unless we are to fall back into 
the trap of Wechsler's neutral principles, neither is politics populated merely by 
preference maximizers.95 
Ill 
Politics and Disagreement 
In the past few decades, many have sought to offer an account of politics 
that accepts the persistence of vigorous, irreconcilable disagreement without 
reducing politics to a process of preference aggregation. This account portrays 
politics neither as a well-behaved dance of reasonableness nor as a clash of 
naked power organs. 
Chantal Mouffe, for example, has advanced the idea that politics is 
founded on a relationship of "agonism" in which conflicting parties 
acknowledg[e] that there is no rational solution to their conflict, [but] 
nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their opponents. They are 
"adversaries" not enemies. This means that, while in conflict, they see 
themselves as belonging to the same political association, as sharing a 
common symbolic space within which the conflict takes place.96 
Mouffe contrasts the relationship of agonism to that of "antagonism," in which 
92. I take this to be the fundamental point advanced by Manning, supra note 81. 
93. On the presumption of reasonableness, see id. at 76. 
94. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy), supra note 7, at 461. 
95. I take this to be the fundamental point advanced by Manning, supra note 81. 
96. Chantal Mouffe, On the Political 20 (2005). 
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"the two sides are enemies who do not share any common ground" and so 
"treat their opponents as enemies to be eradicated."97 In a relationship of 
agonism, "[adversaries do fight?even fiercely?but according to a shared set 
of rules, and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, are 
accepted as legitimate perspectives."98 
Mouffe invites us to understand politics as a specific form of practice that 
is adopted when persons in a society agree to disagree. They disagree about 
what to do, but they agree that they belong to a common polity and that they 
will therefore use politics peacefully to settle differences among themselves. 
The practice of politics is thus to be distinguished both from open warfare, 
which occurs between antagonists who wish to destroy each other, and from 
social relationships that aspire to forms of cooperation and coordination, which 
presume agreement rather than disagreement. Examples of such cooperative 
relationships include bureaucracy and law. 
Jacques Ranci?re offers a difficult but stimulating effort to explain the 
delicate balance between agreement and disagreement that lies at the 
foundation of politics. Ranci?re defines democracy as "a membership in a 
single world which can only be expressed in adversarial terms, and a coming 
together which can only occur in conflict."99 He writes that politics always 
begins with a grievance that can be "addressed" but not "redressed."100 "To 
assume that a common language and a comprehension by each side of the 
other's reasoning are prerequisites for the wrong's being made manifest and 
being debated is not the same thing as objectifying that wrong as a problem 
whose solution is sought by partners acting together."101 
Ranci?re's insight is that political participants are not simply engaged in 
mutual problem solving. A polity is not like a bureaucratic agency in which all 
members are tasked with jointly working together to solve a common 
challenge. Disagreement in politics runs deeper than that. Political participants 
disagree not only about what problems should be addressed, but also about how 
problems that are commonly acknowledged should be redressed. Political 
participants do agree, however, to use politics as the practice by which the 
agenda of a polity will be set and directed. If political participants reach 
agreement about the definition of a problem and about how it should be solved, 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 52. 
99. Jacques Ranci?re, On the Shores of Politics 49 (Liz Heron trans. 2007). 
Ranci?re writes: 
Democracy is neither compromise between interests nor the formation of a common 
will. Its kind of dialogue is that of a divided community. Not that it is indifferent to the 
universal, but in politics the universal is always subject to dispute. The political wrong 
does not get righted. It is addressed as something irreconcilable within a community 
that is always unstable and heterogeneous. 
Id. at 103. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
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they will likely implement the solution based upon a social practice that is 
designed to administer and enforce such an agreement. They will likely use law 
or bureaucracy, neither of which should be confused with politics. That is why 
Ranci?re insists that within politics wrongs can be only addressed, not 
redressed. To redress a wrong is already to move out of the realm of politics 
and into other distinct social practices. 
From the perspective of social practices like law or bureaucracy, politics 
appears anarchic and disorganized. That is because politics is the practice we 
use when we agree to continue to disagree. As Bernard Crick thoughtfully 
observes, when we are within the domain of social practices like law or 
bureaucracy, in which disagreement is continuously repressed, we can lose 
sight of "society ... as a diversity of interests to which politics alone can give 
the necessary degree of unity," 
102 
and we can begin to yield to the illusion that 
society is "a natural unity which politics divides and disturbs."103 Nothing 
could be more misleading: 
It is not administration but government itself which maintains order in 
any r?gime; and in a political r?gime it is the activity of politics itself 
which provides something permanent amidst the mutations. The 
administrator blames politicians for the very thing they can do so 
well?allow diversity and change amidst order.104 
If we ever come to agree about the nature of our problems and about how 
they are to be solved, we will indeed have transcended politics. We need 
politics only when we wish to live together peacefully under conditions in 
which we do not actually concur. Politics rests, as Hannah Arendt famously 
writes, on "the fact of human plurality," on the existence of "men" rather than 
" _ ?105 
man. 
If. .. there were to be some cataclysm that left the earth with only one 
nation, and matters in that nation were to come to a point where 
everyone saw and understood everything from the same perspective, 
living in total unanimity with one another, the world would have come 
to an end in a historical-political sense.106 
Something akin to this perspective also lies at the heart of Jeremy 
Waldron's recent effort to rehabilitate the dignity of legislation.107 Waldron 
postulates a world in which "the prospect of persisting disagreement must be 
regarded... as one of the elementary conditions of modern politics."108 We 
102. Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics 103 (4th ed. 1992). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 108. 
105. Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics 93 (2005). 
106. Id. at 176. The unanimity of opinion presupposed by fascist or totalitarian states is one 
form of the "cataclysm" feared by Arendt. If unanimity were truly achieved, politics could persist 
in neither a fascist nor a totalitarian state. Id. 
107. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation ( 1999). 
108. Id. at 153. "[IJmagining away the persistence of disagreement is like wishing away 
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engage each other in politics to promote a process that will bring "each 
citizen's ethical views and insights ... to bear on the views and insights of each 
of the others," ultimately "providing a basis for reciprocal questioning and 
criticism [that] enabl[es] a view to emerge which is better than any of the inputs 
and much more than a mere aggregation or function of those inputs."109 Even if 
this emergent view does not produce consensus, even if reasonable persons 
continue to disagree, and even if the view can be legitimated only by a brute 
majority vote of a legislature, Waldron insists that it should nevertheless be 
endowed with the respect due to "the achievement of concerted, cooperative, 
coordinated[,] or collective action in the circumstances of modern life," which 
is to say "in the circumstances of politics, including the circumstance of 
disagreement."110 
Common to all these authors is the view that disagreement is essential to 
politics. Yet none of these authors conceptualizes politics as a regime of 
preference aggregation. Each believes that politics can exist only if there is a 
"coming together"111 in a shared "political association"112 that can produce the 
good of "concerted, cooperative, coordinated[,] or collective action."113 Politics 
thus reflects a nest of paradoxes. The very existence and maintenance of a 
polity depends upon deep forms of agreement?agreement that political actors 
will be agonists and not antagonists, that differences will be settled peacefully 
through the practice of politics, and that members of the polity will together 
decide their common destiny and fate. But politics also presupposes and 
requires disagreement. It is a practice in which members of a polity seek to 
forge agreement about what to do under circumstances of disagreement. Within 
politics, members of the polity "interact with one another without compulsion, 
force, and rule over one another, as equals among equals,... managing all. .. 
affairs by speaking with and persuading one another."114 
The practice of politics is, on this account, surprisingly fragile. It survives, 
we might say, between war and law. If our disagreement becomes too intense, 
if we wish to exterminate each other rather than peaceably to live together, we 
cannot engage in the practice of politics. Alternatively, if we agree too much, if 
we cease normatively to value disagreement because we expect all to concur on 
scarcity in an account of distributive justice." Id. at 154. 
In the United States, in Western Europe, and in all other democracies, every single step 
that has been taken by legislatures towards making society safer, more civilized, and 
more just has been taken against a background of disagreement, but taken nevertheless 
in a way that managed somehow to retain the loyalty and compliance (albeit often 
grudging loyalty and compliance) of those who in good faith opposed the measures in 
question. 
Id at 155. 
109. Id. at 106. 
110. Id. at 156 (emphasis omitted). 
111. Ranci?re, supra note 99, and accompanying text. 
112. Mouffe, supra note 96, and accompanying text. 
113. Waldron, supra note 107, and accompanying text. 
114. Arendt, supra note 105, at 117. 
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common remedies for common problems, we also cannot engage in the practice 
of politics. "[I]f ever there was a natural unanimity of opinion in any society on 
all great issues, politics would, indeed, be unnecessary."115 In politics, we strive 
for agreement under conditions in which we expect and protect the persistence 
of disagreement. 
IV 
Law and Politics: Reconceptualizing the Relationship 
I have just sketched an account of politics as a distinct form of social 
order in which persons might live together in peace and social solidarity within 
a single polity and yet preserve the possibility of ongoing contestation about 
what actions the polity might take. This is an interpretive, sociological 
description of what the social organization of politics means for us. The 
interpretation does not rest on any story about particular faculties of the human 
personality, like the distinction between will and reason. Nor does it rest on any 
story about particular principles of human accountability, like the Weberian 
distinction between an absolute ethics and an ethics of responsibility. It rests 
instead on an interpretive account of the particular ways in which we expect a 
specific social practice to promote social solidarity. 
My suggestion in this Article is that we conceive of law in roughly 
analogous terms?as a specific social practice expected to promote social 
solidarity in a particular way. An interpretive, sociological description of 
contemporary law would surely emphasize that we turn to law when we wish to 
accomplish a goal, like the establishment of efficient markets or the creation of 
safe streets, or when we wish to affirm values that we believe we hold in 
common, like equality or privacy. Law functions as an instrument of social 
control and expression in the service of these ends. 
Sometimes the instrument of law works through sanctions and incentives. 
Those who drive unsafely will be penalized, as will those who cheat or who fail 
to meet their obligations to pay overtime to their employees. And sometimes 
the instrument of law works through an expressive authority to proclaim values 
that we deem to be shared and foundational.116 Brown was a significant legal 
achievement even if for many years it did not produce actual desegregation. In 
all these respects, however, we invoke law when we believe that we have 
reached agreement?or when we wish to act as //we had reached agreement? 
and when we wish to implement and entrench our putative agreement. Law, we 
might say, is a practice that presumes agreement, in contrast to politics, which 
presumes disagreement. 
115. Crick, supra note 102, at 64. "Politics is, as it were, an interaction between the mutual 
dependence of the whole and some sense of independence of the parts." Id. at 142. 
116. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503 (2000). 
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Take a paradigmatic example. In politics, we can debate whether and how 
we should prohibit private racial discrimination by employers. If the matter is 
controversial in politics, it means that members of the polity disagree and 
perhaps disagree fundamentally. The plurality of possible political positions 
matches the diversity of the polity. The point of political engagement is to 
persuade others to take common, coordinated action. Insofar as this is 
accomplished through the enactment of legislation, the resulting statute will be 
taken as representing the attainment of social agreement, even if the statute is 
enacted by a simple majority of one. In our society, the enactment of a statute 
warrants the presumption of agreement. It is then the task of courts to identify 
and enforce that presumed agreement. That is their point, which is made mani 
fest by the presumption of reasonableness proclaimed by legal process juris 
prudence. In legal cultures that enforce customary or common law, by contrast, 
courts need not await the positive enactment of a statute in order to enforce 
values or principles that are presumed to represent warranted agreement.117 
Conceiving the nature of judicial decision making from this perspective 
clarifies a great deal about its structure, which everywhere seeks to render 
transparent the putative agreement that law takes as authority for its 
institutional legitimacy. Adjudication is conducted through the use of a highly 
controlled professionalized discourse that screens and monitors the reasons that 
will be officially recognized as legal.118 Legal doctrines like stare decisis, and 
judicial structures like the hierarchical authority of courts, encourage law to 
develop in ways that systematically unfold and implement the values taken by 
the law as grounding its own legal authority. Legal practice sustains its own 
legitimacy by emphasizing and reinforcing the intellectual coherence and 
transparency of legal values, and by entrenching the stability and dignity of 
these values. 
In all these respects, the social practice of adjudication differs from that of 
politics. The space of political argumentation and participation is not narrowly 
professionalized, but is open to all. Although professional politicians exist, they 
must draw support from ordinary citizens who have become politically 
mobilized through social movements or other provocations.119 The domain of 
politics is as motley and as confused as the persons who are moved to 
participate in politics. Political discourse is as plural and as united as the polity 
within which it takes place. Because politics must sustain disagreement, it does 
117. See Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy, supra note 85. 
118. See also Owen M. Fiss, The Death Of the Law?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 11 (1986) 
(Judges are "situated within a profession, bounded at every turn by the norms and conventions that 
define and constitute that profession. 
. . . [Judges] are disciplined in the exercise of their power. 
They are caught in a network of so-called 'disciplining rules' which, like a grammar, define and 
constitute the practice of judging and are rendered authoritative by the interpretive community of 
which the [judges] are part."). 
119. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices and Social 
Movements, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 927 (2006). 
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not contain a single, hierarchically enforced structure of authority, but is 
typically loosely jointed, with disarticulated and nodal points of authority. 
Power in law speaks through a single professional discourse; power in politics 
assumes a myriad of forms. Political actors can deploy the language of values, 
but they can also employ arts as disparate as mobilization, compromise, 
compulsion, fidelity, secrecy, and betrayal. 
The salient features of our politics are designed to represent social reality 
as essentially agonistic, whereas the salient features of our law are structured to 
represent social reality as essentially unified. Because social life is in fact 
neither essentially agonistic nor essentially unified, both politics and law 
misrepresent actual social reality. Disagreement is a stubborn fact that does not 
diminish merely because we have chosen to deploy the social form of law, nor 
does agreement disappear merely because we are engaged in politics. 
Consider the paradigmatic example of racial prejudice that we have been 
examining. It is clear that controversy about racial discrimination will not 
vanish either because society has enacted a statute prohibiting such 
discrimination or because courts have enforced such a statute. Disagreement is 
likely to persist and to become visible in conflicting judicial interpretations of 
the statute. Each court applying the statute may ask the identical legal question; 
each court may seek to determine what agreement society has called upon the 
judiciary to enforce. Yet everyone knows that different courts will nevertheless 
reach different conclusions so long as ongoing political disagreement about 
racial discrimination persists. 
When judges experience disagreement that they cannot resolve, they 
resort to the same rules of majority voting as do politicians.120 A five-to-four 
vote of the Supreme Court has no less legal force because the legal judgment of 
four Justices differs from that of their majority colleagues.121 This illustrates 
that although law is a social practice that is premised upon the normative force 
of agreement, it also contains many subtle mechanisms for dealing with the 
persistent social fact of disagreement. Matters remain controversial in law just 
as they remain controversial in politics. Those literate in the law both recognize 
the persistence of such controversy and habitually ignore its theoretical 
significance. 
Politics, by contrast, is a social practice that is premised upon the 
normative force of disagreement, yet politics cannot proceed unless agreement 
already exists about such basic matters as a mutual commitment to the peaceful 
processes of politics. Just as ongoing disagreement within law should not be 
underestimated, so the bonds of solidarity that make politics possible should 
not be overlooked. In politics, just as in law, continuity, stability, and 
120. Waldron, supra note 107, at 128-29. In discussing this point, Waldron appeals to 
none other than Daniel A. F?rber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical 
Introduction (1991). 
121. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
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predictability are valued. Legislators no less than courts aspire to enunciate 
"rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority 
will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one's 
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge."122 In a successful polity, 
political actors must be agonists, not antagonists. 
To accurately theorize the relationship between politics and law, therefore, 
we must recognize that agreement and disagreement are social facts that persist 
regardless of whether we engage in either politics or law. Politics is a social 
practice that presumes disagreement, yet politics nevertheless depends upon 
and seeks to expand the social fact of agreement. Law is a social practice that 
presumes agreement, yet law nevertheless must find ways to tame, channel, and 
resolve ongoing, persistent disagreement. 
Politics and law are thus two distinct ways of managing the inevitable 
social facts of agreement and disagreement. As social practices, politics and 
law are both independent and interdependent. They are independent in the 
sense that they are incompatible. To submit a political controversy to legal 
resolution is to remove it from the political domain; to submit a legal 
controversy to political resolution is to undermine the law. Yet they are 
interdependent in the sense that law requires politics to produce the shared 
norms that law enforces,123 whereas politics requires law to stabilize and 
entrench the shared values that politics strives to achieve. 
This suggests that any given controversy can be given legal form when we 
wish to act as if we had reached agreement about the meaning and 
implementation of a relevant social principle. Yet any discrete legal principle 
can also reassume political form whenever we discover that our putative 
agreement is chimerical and that we wish to create a valorized space for further 
disagreement. Law and politics should thus be conceived as distinct phases of a 
larger and more inclusive process of social integration by which modern 
heterogeneous societies produce solidarity and control. Modern societies 
require a healthy interrelationship between the social forms of law and politics. 
The hypothetical antidiscrimination statute we have been considering 
aptly illustrates the dynamic interconnection between law and politics. The 
statute's enactment signals the need to act as if society has reached agreement 
on a principle of antidiscrimination. Yet disagreement about the meaning of the 
principle will continue so long as the issues addressed by the statute remain 
divisive. A well-functioning modern society will tame such ongoing 
122. F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 75-76 (Routledge Classics 2001) (1944). 
Compare Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 
110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359,1371 (1997). 
123. "The authoritative source of law is always outside the law itself. Law makes present? 
it re-presents?in a temporally extended form, the normative ground of the political order." Paul 
W. Kahn, The Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America 23 
(1997). 
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controversy by establishing an iterative relationship between law and politics. It 
will facilitate political outlets for continuing debate about the proper legal 
interpretation of the statute, perhaps by once again placing the question of 
racial discrimination on the agenda of political institutions. Contestation about 
the principle of racial equality will thus occur simultaneously in both legal and 
political venues. The initial statute may subsequently be amended.124 The 
amended statute will require yet further judicial interpretation, which may 
excite yet further political mobilization. The dynamic and dialectical 
interdependence of law and politics can continue ad infinitum. 
Reva Siegel and I have observed how this same dialectical movement 
occurs within constitutional law, which (as a matter of formal jurisprudence) is 
theoretically independent of politics.125 Constitutional values represent sites of 
putatively deep, ongoing agreement, the kind of agreement that establishes the 
identity and nature of the polity itself. But the identity of the polity may be 
politically controversial. Courts may articulate what they believe to be a 
constitutional value, like reproductive freedom, and political actors may use 
their decisions to mobilize a political backlash that rebounds to affect judicial 
interpretations of the constitutional right.126 Or political actors may take the 
initiative and propose that certain constitutional values exist?like the right to 
bear arms127 or the right to enjoy gender equality128?and courts may 
subsequently give these values legal form in the context of constitutional 
adjudication. At any given moment, constitutional values can be in play in legal 
124. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1081 (codified in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C, and 42 U.S.C.); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 228 
(2005). 
125. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 373 (2007). 
126. Id. Bernard Crick long ago observed the dependence of judicial constitutional 
interpretation on political debate: "Constitutions are themselves political devices. They may be 
viewed as self-sufficient truths in the short-run; but in the long run it is political activity itself 
which gives?and changes?the meaning of any constitution." Crick, supra note 102, at 147. 
Crick continues: 
When we praise a constitution we are doing no more than praise a particular 
abridgement of a particular politics at a particular time. If the abridgement was a skilful 
one and circumstances are kind, it may last into a long middle period and help to give 
stability to a state. But, in the long run, though the words are the same and formal 
amendments to it may be few, the meaning of it will be different. 
Id. at 148. For a general discussion of dialectical relationship between politics and constitutional 
law, see Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial 
Review, 12 U. On. L. Rev. 1257 (2004). For a specific discussion of the dialectical movement 
sparked by Brown about the meaning of the value of racial equality, see Reva B. Siegel, Equality 
Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 
117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470 (2004). 
127. Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 
122 Harv. L. Rev. 191 (2008). 
128. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five 
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale L.J. 1943 
(2003); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1323 (2006). 
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institutions, in political institutions, or in both simultaneously. The legal 
articulation of such values will affect their political articulation, and vice 
versa}29 Siegel and I use the term "democratic constitutionalism" to 
denominate these complex and interdependent relationships between 
constitutional law and politics.130 
If the relationship between law and politics is conceptualized in this 
dynamic and dialectical way, the exact location of the boundary between law 
and politics is necessarily contestable. From the perspective of politics, it is 
always disputable whether present disagreements should be ceded to the expert 
grammar of the law, or whether extant legal decisions ought to be reclaimed as 
subjects of political dispute. From the perspective of law, it is always 
disputable whether contemporary political disagreements are ripe for legal 
intervention, or whether existing legal judgments can sustain sufficient social 
support to resist falling back into the vortex of politics. It is intrinsically uncer 
tain whether ongoing conflicts over particular values will be addressed within 
legal practice, within political practice, or within both simultaneously. There is 
nothing inherent in the nature of law or politics that can settle this question.131 
It follows that particular legal values are always at risk of slipping away 
from legal control and becoming re-entangled in political debate. In the context 
of statutory interpretation, where the authority of the legislature to reform 
agreed upon values is well understood, this risk is not typically experienced as 
threatening the integrity of law. But matters may be otherwise in the context of 
constitutional rights and structure.132 Constitutional adjudication typically 
articulates values that, from the perspective of the legal system, underlie the 
identity and nature of the polity itself.133 In such matters, legal institutions 
129. In the context of appointments to the Supreme Court bench, for example, 
constitutional values are almost always simultaneously articulated in both legal and political 
registers, and the dialectical relationship between these two organizational practices is given 
concrete anthropological articulation. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law 
and Politics in Judicial Confirmation Hearings, 115 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 38 (2006), 
http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/01/post_and_siegel.html. 
130. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in The 
Constitution in 2020 25 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); Post & Siegel, supra 
note 125. 
131. For a discussion of intrinsic tendencies within political contestation for turning to law 
and third-party decision makers, see Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of 
Governance, in On Law, Politics, & Judicialization 55 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet 
eds., 2002). For a discussion of similar tendencies within the context of constitutional law, see 
Keith Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy (2007). 
132. This is the essence of de Tocqueville's observation. See supra note 14. 
133. Consider article 3a(2) of the Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European 
Union: "The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their 
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive 
of regional and local self-government." Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, Official J. Eur. Union, 
Dec. 17, 2007, C 306/10 at 3. For a discussion of the American case, see Post, supra note 1; Post 
& Siegel, supra note 125. 
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affirm values that they believe make possible the ongoing practice of politics. 
The whole point of Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy) is how the Warren 
Court used the avoidance canon in ways designed to preserve what it regarded 
as fundamental First Amendment principles necessary for the practice of 
democracy. 
In preserving these principles, the Warren Court undoubtedly believed it 
was safeguarding prerequisite values for the ongoing constitutional identity of 
the nation. It is not uncommon for courts to take account of the political 
consequences of their decisions when they believe that such important values 
are at stake.134 Whenever legal institutions imagine themselves as the 
repository of values so fundamental that they define the polity itself, questions 
of judicial statesmanship tend to arise. Consider, for example, Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey. In that case, the Court stated: 
Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be 
earned over time. So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation of 
people who aspire to live according to the rule of law. Their belief in 
themselves as such a people is not readily separable from their 
understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their 
constitutional cases and speak before all others for their constitutional 
ideals. If the Court's legitimacy should be undermined, then, so would 
the country be in its very ability to see itself through its constitutional 
ideals. The Court's concern with legitimacy is not for the sake of the 
Court, but for the sake of the Nation to which it is responsible.135 
The Court imagines itself as conserving the shared social values that make the 
nation possible and that are therefore essential to the preservation of the polity. 
Insofar as "rule of law is secured only by the principled exercise of political 
will,"136 courts will exercise analogous statesmanship to protect the integrity of 
the law itself.137 
In such contexts, courts face a dilemma. If they do not act to protect 
essential values, the contestation of politics might spin out of control and 
undermine both the stability of the polity and the rule of law. Agonism might 
degenerate into antagonism. But if courts act too aggressively, they can 
suppress the very possibility of disagreement that defines politics itself. This 
dilemma is insoluble if it is believed, as some do, that legal judgments 
"foreclose" the possibility of politics.138 But if, as I have suggested, the 
134. For examples, see Post & Siegal, supra note 125 at 427-30; Post & Siegel, Theorizing 
the Law/Politics Distinction, supra note 90. 
135. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992). 
136. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L?pez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 213 (2008) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
137. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
138. Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme 
Court 26 (1999); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 995, 1002 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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boundary between law and politics is essentially contested, then judicial 
judgments engage but do not pre-empt politics.139 
In point of fact, judicial judgments typically provoke a larger, more 
encompassing arena of political disagreement in which legal decisions are 
themselves subject to affirmation, resistance, debate, and modification. Courts 
are, in this sense, necessarily political actors. Their decisions inspire, inform, 
and channel political debate and action. It follows that judicial opinions can be 
constructed in ways that are more or less effective in promoting political 
support for essential values like the stability of the polity or the rule of law. 
These distinct alternatives open the space that makes the practice of judicial 
statesmanship possible and desirable. 
Judges have historically exploited this potential for judicial statesmanship. 
But should they? Because judges must base their decision making on legal 
principles, and because these principles inevitably and appropriately define 
themselves in opposition to criteria that are defined as "non-legal" or 
political,140 the question is whether, from the internal perspective of the law, 
the preservation of fundamental values should count as proper "legal" criteria 
for judicial decision making. The paradox is that such criteria will not be 
derived from the ordinary norms of judicial craft. 
V 
Some Normative Implications 
I have suggested that law is a social practice that presumes agreement. 
From the internal perspective of the law, therefore, authoritative legal 
settlement of a divisive question presumes agreement. The professional and 
institutional structure of judicial decision making requires actors to argue cases 
as though they could be subject to definitive resolution. But the internal legal 
presumption of agreement should not blind legal actors to the ongoing social 
fact of disagreement. This is precisely the confusion that generates the enduring 
attraction of Wechsler's non-consequentialism. 
Wechsler's invocation of neutral principles invites those of us in the legal 
system to imagine that professional legal reason suffices to sustain the legitima 
cy of the law and the effectiveness of legal values. Judicial decisions will retain 
their legitimacy so long as they remain true to legal craft. From this perspec 
tive, judicial statesmanship is either irrelevant to the law or inimical to the law. 
But this perspective is merely an illusion generated by the internal legal point 
of view. Jon Stewart ironizes the underlying hubris of this illusion in his 
summary of Roe v. Wade in his book, America (The Book): A Citizen's Guide 
to Democracy Inaction: "The Court rules that the right to privacy protects a 
139. See Robert Post, Law Professors and Political Scientists: Observations on the 
Law/Politics Distinction in the Guinier/Rosenberg Debate, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 581 (2009). 
140. Niklas Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, in Autopoietic Law: A New 
Approach to Law and Society 12 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988). 
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woman's decision to have an abortion and the fetus is not a person with 
constitutional rights, thus ending all debate on this once-controversial issue."141 
Once we adopt an external perspective and understand that disagreement 
with judicial decisions can always reanimate political controversies capable of 
undermining judicial legitimacy, the immaculate innocence inherent in the 
formulation of "neutral principles" can be understood as merely ideological. If 
courts genuinely believe that certain values are essential for the maintenance of 
the polity and of the rule of law, the fact that judicial decisions may undermine 
these values cannot blithely be dismissed as irrelevant to the internal purposes 
of the law. Insofar as law is concerned with the fundamental commitments that 
underpin the solidarity of the polity?and these emphatically include the 
relative autonomy of the law itself?it would be self-defeating for judges to 
define their role in ways that ignore these fundamental commitments.142 If 
judges incorrectly appraise these commitments?and in the past judges have 
been very badly mistaken in their estimations of the fundamental commitments 
of the polity143?the political system will itself correct their error. 
It is important to acknowledge that such political corrections can be very 
costly, even catastrophic. But this does not imply that judges must pretend that 
they are mere "automatons" without discretion to interpret the law,144 or that 
they must be oblivious to the consequences of their decisions, or that they must 
construct the internal practice of law entirely to avoid the possibility of a mis 
take, because inaction as well as action can carry potentially catastrophic costs. 
To grasp the actual interrelationship between law and politics is instead to 
understand, most precisely, that judges must bear an ethic of responsibility for 
their decision making. As Alexander Bickel has wisely noted, "The Court is a 
leader of opinion, not a mere register of it, but it must lead opinion, not merely 
impose its own; and?the short of it is?it labors under the obligation to 
succeed."145 
Perhaps the most famous and influential example of a court successfully 
using judicial statesmanship politically to entrench fundamental commitments 
like the rule of law is, after all, Marbury v. Madison, in which Chief Justice 
Marshall twisted judicial craft to establish the political legitimacy of judicial 
141. Jon Stewart et al., America (The Book): A Citizen's Guide to Democracy 
Inaction 90 (2004). 
142. The definition of commitments like the rule of law and judicial craft are subject to 
internal dispute and redefinition. See Post & Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction, supra 
note 90. They are not merely mechanical, in part because the establishment of the rule of law is 
itself a social achievement. Carla Alison Hesse & Robert Post, Introduction to Human Rights in 
Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia 13,20 (Carla Alison Hesse & Robert Post eds., 
1999). 
143. The crisis of the New Deal and Dr ed Scott come immediately to mind. Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
144. See Frickey, Wisdom on Weher, supra note 71, and accompanying text. 
145. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at 
the Bar of Politics 239 (2d ed. 1986). 
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review. The example of Marbury is continuously relevant to ongoing judicial 
practice. Marbury illustrates how judges have used statesmanship to construct 
essential elements of our legal structure. Judicial statesmanship does not 
concern merely passive virtues, but is woven into the affirmative fabric of 
American constitutional law. Marbury's spectacular success institutionalizing 
constitutional review has all but eclipsed its manifest inconsistency with norms 
of judicial craft. 
Judges turn to judicial statesmanship when the resources of legal craft 
have been exhausted. That is why narrow criteria of professional competence 
are inadequate to assess decisions like Marbury. Acts of judicial statesmanship 
must instead be evaluated in the same way as we evaluate the important 
initiatives of great political leaders, by the quality of the consequences that they 
produce. Judges who attempt judicial statesmanship must be assessed by an 
ethic of responsibility. 
Because law is constituted by norms of professional practice, judges who 
forsake craft always threaten harm to the relative autonomy of the legal system. 
They invite criticism for corrupting the integrity of the law. As in the case of 
Marbury, however, an ethic of responsibility may vindicate such judges if their 
decisions are deemed necessary to secure overmatching benefits to the legal 
system or to the polity, or if their decisions are perceived as necessary to avert 
even greater harm to the legal system or to the polity. Of judges like Marshall 
we ask whether they have fulfilled their "obligation to succeed." Judicial 
statesmen are vulnerable to the uncontrollable contingency of events. 
If we focus merely on the single example that this Article has discussed, 
Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy) demonstrates how a great Court can 
enfold outstanding judicial craft into profound statesmanship in order success 
fully to protect the freedom of speech that is the lifeblood of any democracy. 
Phil affirms that the Warren Court was acting responsibly in these decisions. I 
agree with his conclusion, and in this Article I have attempted to sketch a way 
of understanding the relationship between law and politics that might justify 
Phil's attraction to these forgotten but exemplary judicial masterpieces. 
In essence, I have invited the reader to step outside the internal 
perspective of the law, which can sometimes be misleading, and to appreciate 
the function of judicial decision making within a more encompassing, external, 
sociological framework. The insights gained from this new perspective can 
profitably be used to modify our understanding of the nature of the judicial role 
and of the limits of judicial craft. It is by following this path that we can begin 
146. Marshall's interpretation of section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 may have been 
implausible from the perspective of pure judicial craft, but it nevertheless empowered Marshall to 
"affirm the doctrine of judicial review in a way that would be unlikely to generate a political 
backlash. What's more, amazingly little damage to doctrine would result." Akhil Reed Amar, 
Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443, 
462 (1989). 
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to understand just how deftly Phil has pointed us, as he always did, in the right 
direction. 
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